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Public policy1. Introduction
Scenario planning has become a widely used method for generating
strategic insights in the public, private and non-for-proﬁt sectors in re-
cent years (Durance and Godet, 2010; Gunn and Williams, 2007;
Wright et al., 2013). Its widespread use in strategic planning processes
can be attributed to the increasing complexity, interconnectedness and
uncertainty that characterizes business andpolicy-making environments.
While a range of approaches to scenario planning exist, the intuitive
logics (IL) approach and its derivatives has been identiﬁed as the most
commonly adopted method (Bradﬁeld et al., 2005; Postma and Liebl,
2005; van Notten et al., 2003; Varum and Melo, 2010). The IL approach
rests on the premise that by developing a range of plausible stories
about how the future could evolve (e.g. Van der Heijden, 2005;
Schoemaker, 1993; Schwartz, 1991; Wack, 1985a,b), they can improve
perception by challenging assumptions and changing mindsets, and
lead to better strategic decisions through an enhanced understanding of
how the future might unfold (Tapinos, 2011; O'Brien and Meadows,
2013; Wright et al., 2013). Its success as a strategic planning tool can be
attributed, at least in part, to accounts of its successful use by Royal/
Dutch Shell (RDS), the global oil and gas giant, in navigating the oil and. MacKay),
. This is an open access article undergas shocks of the 1970s and 1980s (e.g. Wack, 1985a,b; Schwartz, 1991;
Schoemaker, 1993; Van der Heijden, 2005).
Despite its increasing popularity as an approach for making sense of
an uncertain future and for strategic decision-making support, scholars
have sought to augment its capabilities and effectiveness (Derbyshire
and Wright, in press). This has been partly in response to criticisms
that scenarios might not always have the sort of impact on changing
mindsets or inﬂuencing strategic decision-making that advocates of sce-
nario planning purport (e.g. Hodgkinson andWright, 2002;MacKay and
McKiernan, 2010; O'Brien andMeadows, 2013). Some scholars have, for
instance, postulated that the ‘cause–effect’ nature of the IL approach is
overly deterministic and can fail to prepare individuals and/or organiza-
tions for surprising futures (e.g. Burt, 2007; Derbyshire and Wright,
2014, in press). Linear cause-effect approaches to IL privilege the direct
agency, or efﬁcacy of one process (the cause) with another process (the
effect). This ismost evident in the identiﬁcation and separation of forces
shaping the future into those that are ‘predetermined’ from those that
are ‘uncertain’ and the widespread use of inﬂuence diagrams in IL sce-
nario approaches (e.g. van der Heijden, 2005; Van der Heijden et al.,
2002;Wack, 1985a,b). In social systems, we argue in this paper, analyz-
ing causally complex patterns through agent–structure interactions is a
more theoretically robust method for understanding complex causal
patterns underpinning the emerging future. We base our argument on
the premise that a reason for RDS' success in the 1970s and 1980s in
using the method was a profound, if tacit understanding of the socio-the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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economics of the global oil and gas industry.
Despite the underlying social structures of economic systems (e.g.
Bourdieu, 2005), there remains a paucity of social theory-informed
methodological and theoretical development in the scenario planning
ﬁeld. To address this gap, we draw on a scenario exercise as an
illustration of how developing scenarios with a “sociological eye”
(cf.Whittington, 2007) can augment notions of causality in the ILmeth-
od. By “sociological eye”we mean to build on work that has the aim of
enhancing ILmethods in scenario analysis by incorporating sensibilities
from social theory (e.g. MacKay and Tambeau, 2013) and Platonic no-
tions of efﬁcient, ﬁnal, formal and material causality (Derbyshire and
Wright, in press). The scenario exercise itself was part of a wider pro-
gram of research into the “Future of the UK and Scotland” by almost
40 academics from different disciplines in the lead-up to Scotland's ref-
erendum on independence from the United Kingdom (UK) on Septem-
ber 18th, 2014. The study was funded by the UK's largest funding body
for university research, the Economic and Social Research Council
(ESRC).
1.1. Research aims, objectives, purpose
Our paper has two primary aims and objectives that align with the
overall purpose of augmenting notions of causality in the IL approach to
scenario planning (e.g.Wright et al., 2015). First, we aim to drawon social
theory, and particularly social theory that reconciles agent–structure in-
teractions (e.g. Archer, 1995; Bourdieu, 1977; Giddens, 1979, 1984,
1993) with the objective of further developing the critical theoretical
axioms underpinning the method. Second, we aim to couple sensibilities
incorporated from social theory with notions of causality with the objec-
tive of improving scenario planning IL methods. Taken together, our aims
and objectives seek to also address the paucity ofwork in IL approaches to
scenario planning that are informed by social theory, particularly in the
context of public-policy scenarios that deal with widespread societal
change.
1.2. Research questions
In this paper, the primary research question we seek to address is,
how can an understanding of future uncertainties informed by social theory
augment notions of causality in the intuitive logics approach to scenario
planning? In addressing this research question, we also seek to grapple
with two secondary research questions including: how notions of
agency–structure interactions can usefully enhance causal assessments in
the intuitive logics method?; and, how can different notions of the
temporalization of causality be incorporated into the intuitive logics ap-
proach to scenario development?
1.3. Research contributions
This article makes several contributions to the scenario planning
ﬁeld. First, it augments the IL approach to scenario planning by demon-
strating that the development of causality in alternative futures with a
“sociological eye” can lead to a more grounded understanding of
socio-political constraints and potentialities of the range of alternative
futures possible. Second, in doing so, it seeks to extend a nascent line
of inquiry into the social theory axioms underpinning scenarios (e.g.
Hughes, 2013; MacKay and Tambeau, 2013). And third, it also extends
the small literature on scenario planningdirected towards public under-
standing and policy-making by placing agent–structure interactions at
the center of scenario analysis (cf. Cairns et al., 2016; Hughes, 2013).
1.4. Paper structure
The article begins with an overview of scenario planning generally,
and the IL method speciﬁcally. To illustrate the approach, it gives abrief overview of its development, focusing particularly on its use by
RDS. The article then turns to causality in the IL literature, and elabo-
rates on a number of concepts in social theory, such as notions of agen-
cy, objective structures, activity dependence, unintended consequences,
and temporality to augment the IL approach through a systematic inter-
rogation of causation. To illustrate how the concepts can be used, it
draws on a recent scenario intervention in the run-up to the Scottish
referendum on independence from the UK on the 18th of September
2014. Finally, it ends with a discussion of how such augmentations
can help to develop the IL approach to scenario planning.
2. Conceptual overview
In this section, we begin by addressing what scenarios are, before
turning to a brief history of the IL approach to scenario planning as de-
veloped at RDS. After reviewing recent critiques of the use of causality in
IL approaches to scenario planning, the section turns to a number of
concepts drawn from social theory that, we argue, can be used for aug-
menting notions of causality in IL approaches to scenario planning. Our
particular focus is on scenario development as it pertains to public-
policy and widespread societal change.
2.1. What are scenarios and what are their purpose?
While deﬁnitions of scenarios vary to the extent of “rendering it slip-
pery” (Stout, 1998, p. 3), Kahn andWiener (1967, p.6), who popularized
the term, deﬁne them as a “hypothetical sequence of events … for the
purpose of focusing attention on causal processes and decision points”.
They are not predictions, but plausible stories about how the future
could evolve in uncertain and often surprising ways. Rather than assum-
ing away uncertainties, as many forecasting techniques do, they “main-
tain the future as an open, but not an empty space, where facts,
expectations, and perceptions intermingle” (Wilkinson and Kupers,
2014, p. 13). Drawing on a combination of analytical, creative and critical
techniques, they are designed to help their users to gently ‘re-perceive’
reality (Wack, 1985a,b). Scenarios can be thought of as post-cards from
the future, which describe different possibilities and potentialities that
are then sent back through time to be read in the present.
As with a wide range of scenario deﬁnitions, scholars also point out
that there appears to be a confusing array of reasons why organizations
might engage in scenario planning (Wright et al., 2013; also see Burt
and van der Heijden, 2003). Wright et al. (2013) have helpfully identi-
ﬁed three primary purposes that the majority of scenario planning in-
terventions are used for in the extant literature. They are to challenge
conventional thinking to (i) change mind-sets and reframe perceptions
within organizations, (ii) to improve decision-making within strategy
development processes, and (iii) to enhance understanding of connec-
tions, causal processes and logical sequences of events that may shape
the impending future. And while scenario methods are as varied as
the multiplicity of deﬁnitions and purposes associated with the tech-
nique –which at times has led scholars to criticise it for ‘methodological
chaos’ (cf. Varum and Melo, 2010;Whaley, 2008) –many are based on,
or are a derivate of the ‘basic’ IL method (cf. Wright et al., 2013).
2.1.1. The Intuitive Logics (IL) approach to scenario planning
Successive surveys of corporate planning departments have shown
consistently that scenario planning continues to increase in popularity
(Linnemen and Klein, 1983; Malaska et al., 1984; Malaska, 1985;
Rigby, 1993, 2003; Rigby and Bilodeau, 2005, Rigby and Bildeau,
2015). By 2001, anecdotal evidence suggested that some 70%of scenario
planning methods being used for strategic planning were based on, or
derivatives of the IL method (Hart and Rudman, 1999; also see
Derbyshire and Wright, 2014; MacKay and McKiernan, 2010; MacKay
and Parks, 2013). The Bain annual survey of management tools esti-
mates that scenario planning is, at the time of writing, the fastest grow-
ing strategic planning tool (Rigby and Bildeau, 2015).
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tion and imagination with analytical rigour (Wilkinson and Kupers,
2014). It normally follows variations on a number of steps in common
(see Table 1: The intuitive logics approach to constructing scenarios).
As a former head of the business environment division at RDS sums
up, IL scenarios deal with two worlds: “the world of facts and the
world of perceptions. They explore the facts but they aim at perceptions
inside the heads of decision-makers” (Wack, 1985b, p. 140).
Their popularity as a strategic planning tool is closely associated
with their reﬁnement and success at RDS.
2.1.2. A brief history of the IL method as developed at RDS
Its origins can be traced to work carried out in the 1950s at the
military-oriented RAND (Research and Development) Corporation,
and subsequently the Hudson Institute and Stanford Research Institute
(SRI) in the United States (Bradﬁeld et al., 2005). The method was re-
ﬁned in the late 1960s/early 1970s at RDS in response to concerns by
some planners that their forecasting method, known as the ‘uniﬁed
planning machinery’ (UPM), was too reliant on single point predictions
looking 5 years out. Suchmethods, it was felt, were unable to accommo-
date ‘weak signals’ of changes to come, such as geo-political uncer-
tainties that they intuitively felt to be present in their business
environment (van der Heijden, 2005; Wilkinson and Kupers, 2014).
For instance, oil demand was beginning to outstrip supply in the
1960s, Middle East countries were deeply resentful of the West's sup-
port of Israel after the 1967 six day Arab-Israeli war, and by 1970
Libya was demanding a greater share of oil revenues. In addition,
Saudi Arabia had not the domestic capacity to absorb oil revenues, and
Iran's mounting social challenges were all signs that the status quo
was unlikely to continue. The forecasts being produced by the UPM,
then in existence since 1965, were not picking up on these signals
(van der Heijden, 2005; Wack, 1985a,b).
A group of planners at RDS, led by Ted Newlandwho had introduced
the Head of Group Planning, Jimmy Davidson, to the method in 1968,
were taskedwith developing scenarios in 1969. By 1972 four ‘explorato-
ry’ scenarios were developed that included a ‘surprise free’ scenario,
where shocks never happen, a ‘high stakes’ scenario, where oil produc-
ing nations demand a larger share of oil revenues, a ‘low demand’ sce-
nario, characterized by economic depression, and an ‘alternative
energy’ scenario, where there is a switch to new energy sources. These
four scenarios were reﬁned into six ‘decision’ scenarios, released in
January 1973 as “Scenarios for the 1973 Planning Cycle”, and includedTable 1
The intuitive logics approach to constructing scenarios.
Step Description
One Deﬁning the focal issue, key stakeholders and horizon year (how far into the fu
the scenarios will look).
Two Generating a list of ‘forces’ or ‘trends’ driving the future, normally using a PEST
(political, economic, social, technological, environmental and legal) framework
initially through a combination of brainstorming and research.
Three Clustering the driving forces using causal mapping or inﬂuence diagrams.
Four Ranking these clustered forces based on their importance/impact on shaping t
future environment
Five Identifying the ‘predetermined’ or ‘forecastable’ forces from those that are unc
Six Using no less than two, and nomore than four of the most highly ranked uncert
exploring how ‘predetermined’ forces might interact with key ‘uncertainties’ in
causal chain that establishes a ‘roll-out’ of the logics and a skeletal story-line. T
be done ‘deductively’, using a 2 × 2 matrix, or ‘inductively’, letting the roll-out
organically
Seven Fleshing-out the story-lines by developing the interactions and events that lea
scenario.
Eight Testing the scenarios for internal coherence, plausibility, surprise and gestalt (h
scenario ﬁt together to reﬂect the range of uncertainties identiﬁed.
Nine Identifying ‘sign-posts’ and ‘early warning systems’ (key events that can be us
monitor whether a scenario or element of a scenario is coming to pass.
Ten Considering the implications of the scenarios for strategy and/or strategic decia ‘private enterprise’ scenario, where free-market forces intervene, a ‘di-
rigiste’ scenario, where industrial governments recognize the chal-
lenges and act in concert, a ‘high’ supply scenario, where new reserves
are found, a ‘muddling through’ scenario, where the West proactively
encourages energy saving, a ‘low-demand’ scenario, where a counter-
culture of consuming less prevails, and ﬁnally, a ‘crises’ scenario
where the price of oil increases by 5×. By May 1973 the scenario that
was being takenmost seriously at RDSwas the crises, or ‘rapids’ scenar-
io, whose insights, and those of successive scenarios, helped RDS to gain
a competitive advantage over rivals in the turbulent decades of the
1970s and 1980s. The attributed success of RDS during these years to
scenario planning has been largely responsible for its proliferation as a
strategic planning method (Schwartz, 1991; van der Heijden, 2005;
Wack, 1985a,b; also see Bradﬁeld et al., 2005 and Wilkinson and
Kupers, 2014 for a more comprehensive overview of the origins of sce-
nario planning).
2.1.3. Critical reﬂections on ‘standard’ IL approaches to scenario planning
More recently, however, research into the history of scenario planning
at RDS has offered a more critical account of their successes and failures,
surfaced some useful lessons, and directed attention towards areas in
need of further development. Mintzberg (1994), for example, has argued
that the team at RDS may simply have been a talented group of people
who happened to get it right, rather than there being anything intrinsic
about the scenario planning technique itself. Jefferson (2012, p. 195) pro-
vides a more in-depth analysis of the development of the IL method at
RDS. He argues that while their performance in the turbulent years of
the 1970s and 1980s was exceptional, there were numerous failures
that could have made it better. For instance, he argues that there was a
“serious failure up to early 1974 to understand fully and take due note
of forces ‘already in the pipeline’, and a “failure to draw on past experi-
ence.” There was also a downplaying of, for example, environmental con-
cerns, and diversions into unrealistic societal changes and life-style shifts
leading to over-optimistic scenarios. He argues that, “the realism and
awareness of the past (economic, ﬁnancial, cultural, geographic) were of
profound value but not initially recognised and, when recognised, was
not always quickly accepted or drawn upon to realise its full value. This
is a subject of great current relevance”.
It is, therefore, not surprising that in ‘standard’ IL approaches to
scenario planning (cf. Ramirez and Wilkinson, 2014), there has been a
nascent but growing focus on interrogating and enhancing conceptuali-
zations of causality in the scenario literature to address perceivedIndicative literature
ture e.g. Burt and van der Heijden (2003) and Cairns et al. (2016).
EL e.g. Burt et al. (2006), Wright and Goodwin (2009) andWright et al. (2013).
e.g. Wright and Goodwin (2009)
he e.g. van der Heijden (2005) and Wright and Cairns (2011).
ertain e.g. Wack, 1985a,b
ainties,
a
his can
evolve
e.g. van der Heijden (2005), Ramirez et al. (2013), van Klooster and van
Asselt (2006), Schoemaker (1991) and Wack (1985a,b).
d to the e.g. Bowman et al. (2013) and Schwartz (1991)
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(in press) point out, causality is central to the scenario process, but in
practice, frequently goes undeﬁned (cf., Van der Heijden et al., 2002;
Wright and Goodwin, 2009; Bradﬁeld et al., 2015). Indeed, the ‘standard’
IL approach emphasizes “something occurring earlier precipitates and
brings about something else occurring later in time, in a chronological se-
quence of cause-and-effect” (Derbyshire and Wright, in press, p. 4; Van
der Heijden, 2000). Or as Burt (2007) has argued, standard IL approaches
emphasized building scenarios around what is ‘predetermined’, but yet,
the systemic conditions that lead to discontinuities in organizational fu-
tures remains under-investigated.
2.2. Causality and the IL approach to scenario planning
The emphasis on linear cause-effect sequences of events leading to
qualitatively different futures, Derbyshire and Wright (in press) sug-
gest, privileges ‘efﬁcient’ causation – the primary source of the effect –
over other types of causation. Separating what is predictable from
what is not predictable, using inﬂuence diagrams and rolling-out the
different scenario logics by keeping the ‘predetermineds’ constant
weds the method to a narrow view of causation (e.g. van der Heijden,
2005;Wack, 1985a,b). To address this blunt conceptualization of causa-
tion, they draw on Aristotle's (Physics II 3,Metaphysics V 2) conditions
for proper explanation, and offer three further alternatives. They include
material cause, which are the conditions, or materials that enable a
‘step-change’ in the transformation of one ‘state’ into another ‘state’;
formal causation, which focusses on the structure, or form of activities;
and ﬁnally, ﬁnal causation, which highlights the motivated actions of
‘actors’, or the reasons for which a cause happens (Derbyshire and
Wright, in press). Such a nuanced typology of causation, we argue
here, directs attention naturally towards actors and the structures
they interact with, which, we argue, taken together constitute the sys-
temic conditions leading to discontinuity in social systems (cf. Burt,
2007). We would also argue that this is patently consistent with the IL
method of scenario analysis, where scenarios have been described as a
“possible future structure” (Porter, 1985, p. 481), and an approach
where uncertainty “is a basic structural feature of the business environ-
ment” (Wack, 1985a, p. 73).
We build on this line of thinking in this paper by suggesting that so-
cial theory, which is only beginning to percolate into the scenario liter-
ature (e.g. Hughes, 2013; MacKay and Tambeau, 2013), provides a
number of concepts that are useful for augmenting notions of causation
in scenario methods by incorporating all four conditions of causation in
its lexicon. Social theory draws attention to, particularly, interactions
between agency and structure, micro activities and macro conﬁgura-
tions. It suggests that pre-existing structures have a causal effect on
agency, and vice versa. Agents, be they individuals, corporations, gov-
ernments, political parties, religious groups or other institutions, are im-
bued with certain historically inherited predispositions to act in certain
ways. But those actions also have an ‘effect’, often unintended, on struc-
ture as they change over time. Causal form,material, reasons and source
are, therefore, implicit in socio-political explanations of possible futures.
We argue that bymaking them explicit in a social theory-informed aug-
mented framework can lead to a more theoretically compelling ap-
proach to causality in IL scenario methods.
2.2.1. Augmenting notions of causality in the IL approachwith a “sociological
eye”
In addressing issues of causality in the ILmethod to scenario planning,
some scholars have directed attention to the underlying socio-political
dynamics of economic systems, and the rules and resources that govern
them. Mackay and Tambeau (2013), for instance, argue that agent–struc-
ture interactions over time are efﬁcacious in shaping alternative futures.
But in responding directly to calls to develop techniques for identifying
the role that ‘structure’ plays in the future of socio-economic systems
(e.g. Porter, 1985; Van der Heijden, 2000), they limit their focus to astructurationist account of scenario development (cf. Giddens, 1979,
1984, 1989), and thus have less to say about the speciﬁc nature of agency
itself, multiple types of causal interactions, or the interplay between
agent–structure interactions and time. Yet there are a number of concepts
from social theory (Archer, 2003; Bourdieu, 1977, 2005; Giddens, 1979,
1984) that, coupled with different types of causality, provides a useful
framework for modifying the privileging of ‘efﬁcient’ causation in the IL
approach to scenario planning. Moreover, they also help to augment
notions of causality in IL approach to scenario planning by bringing in
the role that temporalization plays in causal processes. Time, from both
a social theoretic and scientiﬁc explanatory point of view (Adkins, 2009;
Salmon, 1984), is of fundamental importance when considering different
causal possibilities about how the future might unfold.
2.2.2. ‘Objective’ social structures as an approximation for formal and
material cause
Social structures reﬂect the ‘objective’ conﬁguration of both institu-
tions and players, and the rules and resources (including cultural, eco-
nomic and symbolic capital) they draw on in a struggle to position
themselves in such systems (Giddens, 1979, 1984, 1989). While social
structures are characterized by competing logics at the level of individ-
ual players, institutions, organizations and society, and comprise con-
tradictions, they are stabilized through mechanisms that evolve to
allow such contradictions to co-exist. This is not to say that they remain
unchanging. Indeed, they evolve at times incrementally through pro-
cesses of interaction, or at other times more radically through ‘jolts’,
‘ruptures’ and ‘unintended consequences’ of action (Mackay and Chia,
2013). A ‘jolt’, ‘rupture’ and ‘unintended consequence’ of action can re-
sult in surfacing contradictions and reconﬁguring positions in a social
system based on relative access to rules and resources, and ultimately,
the realpolitik and dispersion/re-dispersion of power in the system as
new conﬁgurationsmaterialize. ‘Objective’ social structures both enable
and constrain the agency of players by incorporating the ‘rules-of-the-
game’ that they play by. Any attempt to understand the constraints
and potentialities of alternative futures to arise, from this perspective,
require an accounting of both the ‘objective’ structures (e.g. approxi-
mated as formal and/or material cause) and processes of change (e.g.
approximated as formal causation) at work. But social structures, and
the institutions that maintain them, change and can be ruptured
through, for example, an economic or political shock, the futures that
arise will be constrained and enabled by how different causes and the
multiple logics of individual ‘agents’ and wider institutions/organiza-
tions change and relate to one another over time.
2.2.3. The subjective predispositions of agency as an approximation of ﬁnal
cause
Scholars have begun to draw attention to the role that powerful ac-
tors play in shaping alternative futures (e.g. Cairns et al., 2016; Volkery
and Ribeiro, 2009). For example, in a study of scenario planning for low-
carbon transitions, Hughes (2013) developed a three stage framework
for developing scenarios that attempts to give agency amore prominent
place in developing scenarios. It includes a vision and values level, an
actor-network level, and a technical-network level. He argues that the
discreet choices of actors, the effects of long-term values and visions
on choices, and the constraints posed by a physical environment will
have a direct impact on how futures evolve.
Social theory suggests that the role of agency is one that reﬂects a re-
lationship between subjective perceptions of ‘actors/agents’ and the ob-
jective possibilities to act based on the material conditions of ﬁeld-level
structures at a given point and time. Agency in this sense it the capacity
for actors, be they individuals, governments or other institutions/organi-
zations to actwith some effect. Actors both internalize and objectify their
environment, thereby producing part of the objective environment they
are part of (e.g. approximated as ﬁnal cause). Objective conditions (the
cultural, economic, political and social milieu that constitute ‘structure’)
must exist for actors to inﬂuence their environment, and by inﬂuencing
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sense, ‘efﬁcient cause’ can oscillate between agents and structure. The
potentialities to change the future depend on the logic from which
such potentialities are observed (e.g. ﬁnal causation). But they are also
moderated by the formal and material conditions of structure. Modes
of behaviour and dispositions are socialised at an early age in individuals,
as they are with the founding of institutions, and reinforced by culturally
infused practices. They are conditioned, which imbues themwith condi-
tional freedom to act. Action is neither random nor entirely predictable,
because all agency takes place within wider interactions with objective
structures (See Bourdieu, 1977, 2000, 2005; Also see Hughes, 2013 for
his actor–network approach to scenario planning). Futures emerge
through a causal ‘duality’ of structure and agency.
2.2.4. The duality of structure and agency as causal interactions
The duality of structure and agency suggests that agency and struc-
ture are mutually constituted. It suggests that “social structure is both
constituted by human agency and yet is at the same time the very me-
dium of this constitution” (Giddens, 1993; 128–129; emphasis in origi-
nal; Also see MacKay and Tambeau for their application to scenario
planning). At one level of the duality are the behaviours and motiva-
tions of the different agents, or players (ﬁnal causation), while at the
other level are the ﬁeld-level ‘objective’ structures (formal andmaterial
causation). And while they mutually constitute one another, both by
constraining and enabling action, taking Archer's (1995, 1996) line of
reasoning, they are not conﬂated because cultural systems and social
structures have causal efﬁcacy in their own right. Causality cannot be
explained without understanding how these systems and structures in-
teract, both producing and reproducing the environments that emerge.
The duality of structure also implies that efﬁcient, ﬁnal, formal and ma-
terial causes all have a part to play in shaping possible futures. But such
futures, we argue, are also mediated by activity dependencies between
forms of causality, inner conversations and unintended consequences.
2.2.5. Activity dependence, the inner conversation and unintended
consequences
If agents are predisposed to act in certain ways, and pre-existing
socio-economic structures condition the predispositions of agents,
how then do alternative futures arise? Structure and agency aremediat-
ed by what Archer (1995, 2003) has referred to as the ‘inner conversa-
tion’. Actors ‘act’ on their circumstances through an ongoing and
reﬂexively deliberative conversation about aspiration, behaviour, iden-
tity, situation and values, then adjust future actions to the changed cir-
cumstances in ways that are “causally efﬁcacious in relation to himself
and his society” (Archer, 2003, p. 14). In other words, the ‘inner conver-
sation’ refers to the value-base of individuals where their identity and
values gradually evolve within the context of society. Such actions and
interactions have the potential to result in what retrospection might
deem to be “accidents” or “unintended consequences” of action
(Mackay and Chia, 2013). Butwhile neither structures nor the predispo-
sitions of actors are predictive in themselves, their properties contain
both the limits and potential of alternative futures coming to pass. Ar-
cher refers to this as ‘activity dependence’, where actions:
“are only efﬁcacious through the activities of human beings, but in
the only acceptable manner, by allowing that these [structures] are
the effects of past actions, often by long dead people, which survive
them (and this temporal escape is precisely what makes them sui
generis). Thus they … [are the] autonomous possessors of causal
powers”.
[Archer (1995), p. 148.]
So while an ‘accident’ or ‘unintended consequence’ can trigger a
possible world, possible worlds are constrained by agent–structure de-
pendencies and predispositions, mediated by inner conversations. Con-
versations, as instruments of mediation between different forms ofcausality, continuously engender perceptions, thoughts and actions, but
within limits imposed by the “the historically and socially situated condi-
tions of its production” (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 95). They allow for a concep-
tualization of the future as “conditioned and conditional freedom”, rather
than purely as a product of random “accident” or “chance”. But such con-
ceptualizations are closely bound upwith notions of the temporalization
of causality.
2.2.6. Temporalization of causality: Clock time or event time?
From this perspective, what is causally possible in terms of alterna-
tive futures that can emergewithin the constraints and enablements im-
posed by objective structures and subjective perceptions is linked closely
with notions of ‘clock’ time and ‘event’ time.Where clock time is viewed
by sociologists as a ‘thing-in-itself’, such as a calendar, time-table or
schedule (e.g. the horizon year in scenario studies), event time involves
its temporalization, itself constituted by the logic and practice of agents
themselves (Bourdieu, 1977). The locus of control for clock-time is,
therefore, externally imposed in the form of deadlines and assumes efﬁ-
cient causality. Event-time, by contrast, unfolds through its own logic
until a natural break or end is reached and makes room for ﬁnal, formal
and material causal interactions. In other-words, notions that some
‘event’ will happen by a certain date that is characteristic of scenario
studies bellies the possibility that objective structures, and the cultural,
economic and social systems that maintain them take time to adjust.
The time they take depends on how quickly new institutional or struc-
tural arrangements are incorporated in practice, new relationships are
established, etc. New technologies, for instance, may have a disruptive
and profound impact on society, but their development follows a logic
that is constituted by the emergence of new ways of networking, relat-
ing, working and so on. The internet, for example, has ‘disrupted’ entire
industries, ways of communicating, working and so on, but such disrup-
tion has been more than 40 years in the making. The most important
point here is that, from a social theory-informed understanding, the fu-
ture is not something that is out-there, but its potentiality and the
range of alternative futures possible is already latent in the present and
the past. In other words, alternative futures are to be found in present
conﬁgurations of objective structures and the historically constituted
predispositions of the players in the game, but their manifestation is de-
termined by causally complex interactions that unfold at their own pace
(Bourdieu, 2000, p. 208; Also see Adkins, 2009). A reliance on ‘clock-
time’, we suggest, may explain the reasons why, as in the case of RDS,
scenarios can become ‘over-optimistic’ or fail to take into consideration
‘forces already in the pipeline’ (cf. Jefferson, 2012). We postulate that
by focussing on different forms of causality that are implicit in agent–
structure interactions, and giving greater emphasis to ‘event-time’ in sce-
nario analysis, such short-comings in IL methods can be addressed.
2.3. Section summary
In summary, while evidence suggests that the IL approach to scenar-
io planning continues to be awidely used technique, scholars have been
calling for critical appraisal of itsmethodological and theoretical axioms
with an aim of improving the method and its prospects (e.g. Wright
et al., 2015). Such calls are emblematic of more focused concerns
about the systematic interrogation of causal processes in the IL scenario
planning approach (e.g. Burt, 2007; Derbyshire and Wright, 2014, in
press; Jefferson, 2012). We argue that social theory provides a number
of theoretical insights whose incorporation into scenario planning prac-
tice has the potential to augment the IL approach and offers the prospect
of a novel elaboration of the method, particularly in contexts of wide-
spread societal change.
The framework thatwe develop here is one that draws attention to a
systematic analysis of objective structures, the predispositions of actors,
the recursive inter-play between action and structure, the role of inner
conversations in mediating between the two, and ﬁnally, the role of
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the IL approach (see Table 2: Summary of key social theory concepts).
In the following section we operationalize the framework and illus-
trate its use by applying it to the Scottish referendum on independence
from the United Kingdom in September 2014.
3. Research design
The studywas part of awider programme of research into the Future
of the UK and Scotland. The programme of activities aimed to both in-
form the public debate in the run-up to the referendum and to assist
in planning across a wide range of policy areas affected by the outcome
of the vote — whether for Scottish independence or for Scotland to re-
main as part of the Union. The following account of the application of
an intuitive logics approach with a “sociological eye” is aimed at illus-
trating the perspicacity of augmenting ILmethods through amore social
theory-informed notion of causality. This section begins with an over-
view of the referendum debate itself as background context to the
study, followed by an overview of the scenario methods, an illustration
of the scenario approach itself, and ﬁnally a brief note onwhat occurred
as an indicator of the framework's validity.
3.1. Prologue: background context to the study
In the September 18th, 2014 referendum, Scottish voters were
asked: ‘Should Scotland be an independent country. Yes/No’. The binary
nature of the question led to two opposing campaigns offering two dis-
tinctly different visions for Scotland and theUK in the lead-up to the ref-
erendum. The two scenarios that emerged from the campaign
constitute ﬁnal causation, as they themselves are the end in which the
referendum was instigated. They were, therefore, an intrinsic part of
the causal texture to any future scenarios.
3.1.1. The ‘Yes’ side
In a series of papers, the Scottish Government argues that Scotland
has a highly skilled workforce, world-class businesses, an international-
ly recognised brand, a reputation for innovation, and substantial natural
resources. It suggests that industrial manufacturing has suffered de-
cades of neglect. The UK economy, it proffers, is dominated by London
and the South East. Many of the policy levers for creating jobs and
wealth in Scotland are reserved powers for Westminster. The Scottish
Government states:
“Control of taxation, public spending limits, regulation of business
and industry, and competition policy all rest in London. Successive
devolved Scottish governments have had considerable success in re-
ducing unemployment, increasing employment and promotingTable 2
Summary of key social theory concepts.
Concept Description
Causality Factors, mechanisms, processes tha
Efﬁcient causation The originator, or source of the cha
Formal causation Focuses on the conﬁguration, patte
Material causation The conditions, or materials that en
Final causation Emphasizes the ends, motivations,
‘Subjective’ agency ‘Actors’ (individuals, government,
Predisposition Actors are a product of their exper
interpretations.
‘Objective’ structures Objective structures refer to the co
Capital The cultural, social and symbolic ‘r
Duality of structure Agency and structure mutually con
Process Field-level processes refer to intera
Temporalization A period by which an action, condi
Clock-time Clock-time runs to an imposed sch
Event-time Event-time runs until an event hasinward investment. But the fundamental economic decisions that af-
fect Scotland are taken in Westminster, often by governments that
have no popular mandate in Scotland, and in the interests of an
economy and society with different priorities from Scotland”.
[Scottish Government (2013), p. 42.]
Independence, the Scottish Government maintains, will allow it to
reduce Air Passenger Duty by 50%, business rates for small businesses,
and corporate tax by three percentage points to counter the gravitation-
al pull of London and the South-East. Compliance costs for business will
be reduced through a simpliﬁed tax system, and, combinedwith greater
control over immigration and capital investment in infrastructure, will
improve productivity. Links between businesses, funding providers,
public sector agencies and universitieswill be improvedwith a coherent
strategy and shared priorities. A package of employment measures de-
signed to enhance employee representation and female participation
on company boards and to create cohesion and opportunity in the
workplace will help to improve fairness and company performance
(Scottish Government, 2013). The economywill be rebalanced through
policies to improve innovation and exports and re-industrialisation
(Scottish Government, 2014a).They argue:
“An independent Scotland will have the opportunity to pursue poli-
cies designed to grow the economy and create jobs. With responsi-
bility for the full range of policy levers, the government of an
independent Scotlandwill be able to create amore supportive, com-
petitive and dynamic business environment”.
[Scottish Government (2013), p. 96.]
The Scottish Government views independence as an opportunity to
transform the economy through policy choices that better reﬂect the
priorities of Scottish households and businesses, and to create a fairer
society (Scottish Government, 2014b).
3.1.2. The ‘No’ side
The UK Government argues in their Scotland Analysis papers that
Scotland has ﬂourished as part of the UK; it is one of its wealthiest
parts. Scotland's economy has outperformed many small independent
European states. The UK, they maintain, is one of the most integrated
single markets in the world, and Scottish businesses have become suc-
cessful within that policy and regulatory context. Scotland's strong sec-
tors in defense, energy and ﬁnancial services rely on the UK market
where a majority of their trade is. As part of the UK, Scottish businesses
have a market of 63 million people. An independent Scotland would
have a population of 5.3 million. They argue that some 70% of Scottish
exports go to the rest of the UK (rUK). In addition, goods, services and
people can move freely throughout the UK. Furthermore, business andt have some ‘effect.’
nge is the cause.
rn or structure of activities as the cause.
able a ‘step-change’ from one state to another state is the cause.
or purpose as the cause.
institutions, organizations etc.) who act/intervene with some effect.
ience and history, which inﬂuences and shapes their behaviour, choices and
nﬁguration of actor's positions and institutions within a ‘ﬁeld’.
esources’ that agents draw on to position themselves within a ﬁeld.
stitute one another. They are both medium and outcome of socio-political processes.
ctions taking place within ﬁelds over time and imply change.
tion, event or process exists, continues, unfolds and is measured by.
edule and is based on an external logic.
occurred or a task is ﬁnished and is based on an internal logic.
Table 3
Scenario method overview.
Step Description of the augmented IL scenario approach drawing on social
theory
One The focal issue was deﬁned in terms of the uncertainty of the Scottish
referendum outcome. Participants in the process were identiﬁed as Senior
Fellows in the ESRC programme. A ‘clock-time’ horizon of 5 years was set.
Two Drawing on the ‘evidence-base’ produced by the research team, phase one of
the data analysis applied a traditional PESTLE analysis to identify scenario
drivers/forces.
Three Phase two of the analysis drew on social theory concepts to cluster the scenario
drivers\forces into structures and agents.
Four Scenario drivers were then ranked in terms of their importance.
Five Structures were deemed to be pre-conﬁgured, and therefore relatively
predetermined. Agency was analyzed in terms of their predispositions, and
whether actions or reactions could be deemed uncertain.
Six The binary nature of the referendum question justiﬁed adopting a 2 × 2
matrices to structure the initial development of four scenarios.
Seven Fleshing-out the story-lines by developing the interactions and events that
lead to the scenario.
Eight Testing the scenarios for internal coherence, plausibility, surprise and gestalt
(how the scenario ﬁt together to reﬂect the range of uncertainties identiﬁed)
by applying ‘event-time’.
Nine Identifying ‘sign-posts’ and ‘early warning systems’ (key events that can be
used tomonitor whether a scenario or element of a scenario is coming to pass).
Ten Considering the implications of the scenarios for strategy and/or strategic
decisions.
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tutions, regulations, infrastructure and a single labourmarket. Costs and
investment in, for instance, energy, are shared by the UK as a whole.
Moreover, costs for businesses and consumers are kept lower by the
reputation of UK institutions and the scale of the UK. They argue:
“As it stands, the UK is a true domestic single market — with free
movement of goods and services, capital and people. Businesses
are able to trade freely across the whole of the UK; consumers ben-
eﬁt froma greater number and variety of goods and services at lower
prices; and workers are able to access a greater number of jobs
allowing them to maximise their skills and realise their range of as-
pirations. It is one market with no internal barriers to the ﬂow of
goods, capital and labour”.
[HM Government (2013), p. 5.]
The UK Government argues that if Scotland were to become inde-
pendent, the UK would cooperate in areas of mutual interest, as it
does with other independent states. There would not be a monetary
union with a shared currency with Scotland. Scotland would have to
support its own ﬁnancial sector during crises. Scottish businesses and
consumers would no longer beneﬁt from the same borrowing rates
available to the UK. Scottishﬁrmsmight no longer be eligible for bidding
on MoD contracts. Costs and investment in, particularly, energy, would
no longer be spread across the UK as a whole, but borne by Scotland.
Scotland would have to set up its own funding councils for universities.
Trade might also be reduced by ‘border effects’ caused by trade barriers
between the UK and Scotland (HMGovernment, 2013, p. 6). They state:
“The UK's shared business framework helps drive growth and com-
petitiveness across the UK, and is at the centre of Scotland's success
in creating businesses that can compete on theworld stage. This UK-
wide framework and guaranteed access to the whole of the UK's do-
mestic market, underpins FDI in Scotland”.
[HM Government (2013).]
They conclude that Scottish business has the best of both worlds:
they have the beneﬁt of the size, stability and strength of the UK, and
they are also supported by the focused and targeted efforts of the Scot-
tish Government using devolved powers.3.2. Method
The scenario process followed an adapted version of the ‘improvised’
IL approach (see Cairns et al., 2016 for further details). The exercise was
part of the Future of the UK and Scotland program, initiated and funded
by the UK's Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC). The scenarios
drew on extensive in-depth research by the multidisciplinary academic
team involved in the program. The team itself consisted of 12 ‘Senior
Fellows’ and some 40 researchers in total. The aim of the program was
to provide objective, politically neutral research that could be drawn
on by the public, the private sector and policy-makers to inform the de-
bate in the lead-up to Scotland's September 18th, 2014 referendum on
independence from the United Kingdom.
Given the difﬁculties in coordinating diaries, and time-poor senior
academics, the process did not follow a traditional, multi-stage, struc-
tured scenario processes (e.g. van der Heijden, 2005; Schoemaker,
1995;Wright and Cairns, 2011;Wack, 1985a,b), but instead incorporat-
ed the different stages of the IL approach in an iterative scenario devel-
opment and on-line debate process that allowed, at each stage of the
development of the scenarios, to be challenged, discussed and reﬁned
(see Table 3: Scenario method overview).
The objective of the scenario processwas to inform the public debate
about different future possibilities for Scotland and the UK through ob-
jective, politically-neutral evidence-based scenarios.3.2.1. Data sources and scenario development
Thedata being drawn on for the scenarios camedirectly from the ex-
tensive research being conducted into the political, economic, social and
legal implications of a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ vote in the referendum. Primary data
from across the projects included hundreds of semi-structured inter-
views on different aspects of the independence debate, as well as exten-
sive analysis, both quantitative and qualitative, of secondary data. In this
way, the scenarioswe producedwere evidence-based and routed in rig-
orous, multi-disciplinary analytical techniques (for supporting evidence
see Armstrong and Ebell, 2014; Bekker andWarne, 2013; Curtice, 2016;
Dunleavy, 2014; Henderson, 2014; Keating, 2013; King, 2014; Levie,
2012; Lisenkova and Mérette, 2013; MacKay and Stoyanova, 2013;
McCollum et al., 2014; McEwen, 2014; Phillips and Tetlow, 2014a,b;
Price, 2014; Riddell et al., 2013; Tierney, 2013a,b; Tindal et al., 2014;
Young, 2013).
While the Fellows were meeting regularly to discuss their research
and disseminate ﬁndings, much of the ‘brain-storming’ of the scenario
drivers, their relative importance and uncertainty, and the outline of
the story-lines came from on-line discussions. Exchanges were often
tense, with a clear dividing-line falling between thosewhose disciplinary
training was in politics or related and those whose training was in eco-
nomics or related. In general, political scientists emphasized the primacy
of politics and institutional stability in any future that might evolve, and
were more sanguine about the prospects of Scottish independence.
Economists were generally more skeptical about the immediate pros-
pects of an independence Scotland (iScotland), and emphasized the eco-
nomic fundamentals, institutional ruptures and market reactions. The
authors of this paper, who have extensive experience as both scenario
practitioners and scholars, led the exercise. The ESRC, which was very
keen to remain seen as politically-neutral in the debate, moderated the
more extreme scenarios that could have emerged from the data and de-
bate. Nevertheless, the research teamwas comfortable with the range of
uncertainties interrogated in the scenarios.3.2.2. Data analysis and scenario drivers
Data analysis occurred in two stages. In stage one, datawas clustered
into key drivers/trends based on the academic ﬁndings from domain-
speciﬁc experts. Initial assessments of the importance of such drivers,
and their relative certainty/uncertainty emerged naturally from the
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ample, we identiﬁed continuing EUmembership, a rejection of a curren-
cy union between two independent states, aging demographics in
Scotland, deﬁcit and debt-to-GDP ratios and public attitudes towards is-
sues around immigration, some devolution of powers from London to
Edinburgh regardless of the vote outcome, and the EU as relatively cer-
tain. Transition costs, the division of debt, the removal of the UK's nucle-
ar deterrent (Trident) from Scottish soil, whether the UKwould hold an
‘in-out’ vote on continuing membership in the EU, and the division of
UK assetswasmuch less certain. The two primary uncertainties, howev-
er, was the vote itself (a ‘yes’ or ‘no’), and how public opinion and the
two negotiating governments would react. In phase two, we drew ex-
pressly on concepts from social theory to identify and cluster scenario
drivers into ‘objective’ structures and ‘subjective’ agency. Here, we
also kept notions of agency–structure interactions, clock-time vs event
time, different forms of causality (efﬁcient, ﬁnal, formal, material), and
concepts of ‘activity dependence’ (Archer, 1995), ‘inner conversations’
(Archer, 2003) and ‘unintended consequences’ (Mackay and Chia,
2013) at the forefront of our analysis as conceptual devices for interro-
gating agent–structure interactions.
3.2.3. Identifying “objective structures” as an approximation for formal and
material cause
In this stage we follow Bourdieu (1977, 2005) and Giddens (1979,
1984) in identifying the ﬁeld-level deep structures that constitute
the predetermined drivers. The predetermined drivers for the Future
of Scotland and the UK, then, constitute the semi- autonomous social
structures that consist of institutionalized cultural, economic and so-
cial systems, and the interconnected network of relations that main-
tain them. In the case of Scotland, such material structures are
revealed in, for example, relatively high rates of public spending on
social welfare, modest rates of entrepreneurialism, pockets of inno-
vation particularly around universities, and deprivation around
areas where there has been a historical loss of heavy industry, decid-
edly left-of-center mainstream politics, an aging population, a highly
integrated economywith the rUKwhosewealth creation is reliant on
a small proportion of large private sector companies who depend on
access to the rUK market, and the institutions that span the entire
UK. They also, however, are reﬂected in wider social attitudes to-
wards, for example, the EU, immigration, politics etc. Altogether,
the objective structures constitute and approximation for material
cause, as they refer to the conﬁguration that out of which would con-
strain and enable emerging futures.
3.2.4. Identifying agency and the subjective perceptions of actors as
approximations for efﬁcient and ﬁnal cause
In this stage we followed Hughes (2013) deﬁnition of actors as
“human individuals, or groups of humans such as companies, govern-
ments or other organizations.” Here, the major actors consist of the
Scottish government and the broad church of organizations that fall
within the umbrella of a the independence camp, the Conservative, La-
bour and Lib-Dempolitical parties, industry broadly deﬁned, and partic-
ularly large companies and industry bodies, the media, universities, the
UK government and its constituent parts, the EU and its 26 other mem-
ber states, and the international ﬁnancial ‘markets’ that consist of the
global ﬁnancial institutions. While each of these actors interpret the in-
dependence debate through their own subjective logic, their behaviour
is, in part, predisposed to act in certain ways through a combination of
experience, history, identity (i.e. Scottishness or Englishness), values
and self-interest. And while such behaviors have the potential to effect
the “objective structures”, such effects are only ever partly intended be-
cause of the constraints and opportunities imposed by activity-
dependence on such ﬁeld level conﬁgurations and the capital (be it cul-
tural, economic, political, symbolic) they can draw on. In so doing, such
interactions become part of the “objective structures” that they contend
with in the future, and the activities and practices that result. This is alsowhy the context for the debate – the two narratives emanating from the
two sides of the debate – is crucial context, because those narratives re-
ﬂect the ‘inner conversations’ taking place, and inevitably become part
of the future landscape as an approximation for ‘ﬁnal cause’, even if in
unintended ways. But the key uncertainties that are most highly
important in this context pertain to agency-structure interactions in
terms of (1) will the Scottish electorate vote yes or no; and (2) the de-
gree to which the behaviours of actors lead to structural continuity or
change.
3.2.5. Temporalizing causality with clock time and event time
While scenarios are often measured in clock time, as with horizon
years, scenarios constructedwith a ‘sociological eye’ direct attention to-
wards ‘event’ time. Event time suggests that there is a logic to events
themselves, where agent–structure interactions result in the actualiza-
tion of new practices, but those practices are in themselves a form of ac-
tualization. The relevance of event time for scenario planning is that it
gives a more realistic idea of whether the logics underpinning story-
lines, the actualization of time found in the unfolding of events, are
plausible within the clock-time of horizon years. While the horizon
year – the clock time – for this scenario exercise was looking out
5 years, the event time, time internalized by the event, was used to
gauge plausibility (Adkins, 2009; Bourdieu, 2000).
The temporalization of causality is particularly important for
assessing the transition costs from one structural conﬁguration to
another under different scenarios. While it is certain that there will
be costs in any transition towards a new constitutional arrangement,
it is uncertain what those costs might be, or how long it might take to
recoup them. Some academic work suggests that there are three
components to transition cost: they include the ﬁscal costs of setting
up new institutions, the costs of disentangling the two states, and the
effects of uncertainty (Young, 1994a,b). While the broad range of
what the costs of setting up new institutions can be estimated
(Young, 2013), the costs of disentangling the two states are relative-
ly uncertain. Most importantly, however, are the effects of uncertain-
ty. There are three main parameters to the effects of uncertainty,
which include how much economic output is lost in the transition,
the length of time uncertainty effects are prolonged, and the rate of
growth that can be achieved following any transition period. How
much economic output is lost, how long the transition period from
a seceding state to an independent state would take (including
how long it would take to conclude all of the negotiations), and
how much growth could be achieved afterwards, then, is a signiﬁ-
cant uncertainty that has wide-ranging implications for Scotland's
prospects (Dunleavy, 2014).
3.3. Section summary
We developed our research design with the aim of incorporating
concepts from social theory in order to augment notions of causality
in the IL method to scenario planning. Against a contextual back-drop
of the referendumonScottish independence from theUK,we developed
our scenarios to reﬂect the parameters of uncertainties following the
vote, as analyzed through plausible variations of structure–agent inter-
actions, activity dependencies, inner conversations, event time, and un-
intended consequences of action. Given the binary nature of the
referendum question, four scenarios emerged naturally from the
analysis.
4. The scenarios
From the above analysis, the “objective structures” constraining or
enabling the subjective, predisposed behaviour of actors suggests that
there were thus four broad scenarios, reﬂecting a range of possibilities,
that could have plausibly emerged after the September 18th
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ture of Scotland in the UK).
The scenarios are as follows:4.1. Independence ‘lite’
In the “independence ‘lite’” scenario, there is a ‘yes’ votewhere agen-
cy is relatively collaborative and conciliatory leading to constructive ne-
gotiations, with a signiﬁcant amount of cooperation and partnership.
Such a scenario is predicated on the eschewing of the identity politics
in both Scotland and England that had become a hallmark of the refer-
endum campaign, allowing for considerable policy coordination be-
tween the two states. We have termed this scenario independence
‘lite’ landing (quadrant ‘A’ in the table). This is because in this scenario,
the transition event time is short, with agent–structure interactions that
keep uncertainty, institutional/structural rupture and volatility relative-
lymodest and short-lived. However, for this scenario to come about, the
rUK government, who has publicly stated that the risks of a currency
union without ﬁscal or political union are too high, as well as warnings
from over 16 global ﬁnancial institutions, act against their proclama-
tions, and accept this arrangement. This is on the back of a relatively
muted public reaction to Scotland's vote for independence in the rest
of the rUK. This, however, necessitates the iScottish government, and
electorate, to accept that theywill havemonetary policy largely dictated
by the Bank of England, of which theywill have only marginal inﬂuence
over. In addition, restrictions are placed on Scotland's ability to run sig-
niﬁcant ﬁscal deﬁcits. Moreover, the iScottish government, who is de-
manding the removal of the UK's nuclear submarine deterrent, which
is based in Scotland, but of high symbolic value to the rUK and NATO,
make conciliations. The ‘inner conversation’, and the cultural and social
capital (in terms of the rules and resources that sustain it) ismaintained
through considerable structural continuity. Businesses located in Scot-
land are not put-off by the politically left-leaning, statist disposition of
the Scottish government as an unintended consequence of the structur-
al constraints placed on them by the settlement. The existing structures
of the EU also serve to constrain the actions of Belgium and Spain, with
their own independence movements, and with some concessions, sup-
port Scotland's expedited accession into the EU. Finally, the price of oil
meets the Scottish government's forecasts of USD$113/barrel, allowingFig. 1. Scenarios for the Fututhem to maintain 10% higher public spending on social programmes.
They also achieve the 1% productivity gains from investment in infra-
structure and training by the end of their ﬁrst term. In this scenario,
agency is largely constrained by structure, and event time is kept
short with modest transition costs.4.2. Independence ‘heavy’
In the “independence ‘heavy’” scenario, a yes vote leads to behaviours
where actors and their negotiations are combative as motivations con-
ﬂict, and different sides negotiate on what they perceive to be narrow
national-interests. This scenario was termed “independence ‘hard’ land-
ing” (quadrant ‘B’ in the table), because it is characterized by prolonged
uncertainty, and structural rupture and volatility. The sudden
disentangling of shared institutions, be they cultural, economic, social
or political, which evolved over centuries, requires the establishment of
new institutions, practices and processes, and the rules and resources
that sustain them; event time is stretched beyond the 18month schedule
set-out for independence. This results in amuchmore severe loss of eco-
nomic output and the tax receipts that ﬁnance public spending. Such a
scenario is driven by the agency of, in particular, the governments in
Brussels, Edinburgh and London. The rUK government, driven by angry
public opinion, and a general view that Scotland is ﬁnancially subsidized
by the rUK, follows throughwith public statements that there is to be no
currency union without a ﬁscal and political union. Large businesses,
fearing the disintegration of theUK singlemarket, implement contingen-
cy plans tomigrate activities to the rUK,where themajority of theirmar-
kets are. The deep cultural and social structures of, particularly, a much
more politically left-leaning Scotland, constrain the ability of the Scottish
government to appease business. This leaves the Scottish economy, and
the government tax receipts for public spending, muchmore dependent
on volatile oil revenues. The iScottish government, in response, follows
through on threats to insist that the UK's nuclear submarine deterrent,
based in Scotland, is moved. This is a highly symbolic action designed
to appease opponents of it in Scotland, but infuriates both the rUK gov-
ernment and NATO. This leads to a wider fracturing of shared cultural
and social institutions across theUK, including the loss of the BBC in Scot-
land.While the EU excepts an iScotland's ascension into the EU, in such a
scenario, countries with their own independence movements, such asre of Scotland in the UK.
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process, and sign up to joining the Euro-zone. However, Scotland's vote
for independence has the unintended consequence of handing the ‘out’
campaign in a rUK-EU referendum in 2017 victory, resulting in a resur-
gence of business investment in Scotland to maintain access to the EU
market. With Scotland's economy reeling, the ‘inner conversation’ in
Scotland begins to shift away from inward-looking identity politics and
state socialism towards an outward-looking entrepreneurial competi-
tiveness. The ‘inner conversation’ in the more politically right-leaning
rUK, by contrast, does the opposite. In this scenario structure adjusts to
the actions and unintended consequences of agency.
4.3. Devo ‘Minor’
In the “devo ‘minor’” scenario (quadrant ‘C’ in the table)where there
is a ‘no’ vote, negotiations are combative between government actors, as
Scottish devolution slips down the priority list in the lead up to the 2015
general election because the main unionist parties cannot agree on
what powers can be devolved. Moreover, public opinion in the rUK is
in no mood to accommodate further devolution to Scotland. This leads
to a Quebec-style ‘neverendum’ situation, where the ‘inner conversa-
tion’ in Scotland focusses on independence,with constant calls for a sec-
ond independence referendum by thwarted nationalists; the symbolic
capital of the independence movement increases across Scotland.
Anti-English sentiment in Scotland also continues to build, as does
‘identity’ politics, and the cultural capital of shared institutions across
the UK declines. This is accompanied by a prevailing anti-big-business
rhetoric, and begins to drag on the Scottish economy as business invest-
ment goes elsewhere and big Scottish companies quietly migrate their
activity outside Scotland. We have called this scenario ‘devo minor’ be-
cause under the ScotlandAct 2012, Scotland is to receive signiﬁcant new
powers, which will inevitably result in structural change as the various
actors, be they the UK or Scottish governments, political parties, busi-
ness etc. are constrained by the existing structural conﬁguration. How-
ever, this too is dependent on the changing political landscapewith aUK
general election in 2015, a Scottish election in 2016, and the possibility
of a referendum on the UK's continuing membership in the UK in 2017.
A Conservative-led coalition in the UK general elections of 2015, a sub-
stantive majority for the Scottish National Party (SNP) in the Scottish
elections of 2016, and a vote by the UK to leave the EU in 2017 all con-
spire to lead to subsequent calls for a second Scottish referendum on in-
dependence from the UK in 2019. In this scenario, structural continuity
between Scotland and the rUK remains strong, initially constraining
agency through activity dependence. But an unintended consequence
is that agency becomes increasingly fractious between the London-
based UK government, and the Edinburgh-based Scottish nationalist
government.
4.4. Devo ‘Major’
In the “devo ‘major’” scenario, a ‘no’ vote results in quick accommoda-
tion of further devolved powers to Scotland (quadrant ‘D’ in the table). In
this scenario, the Scottish government becomes a relatively autonomous
jurisdiction within the UK. Such a scenario sees agent–structure interac-
tions that result in signiﬁcant structural adjustment (in terms of both at-
titudes and values, as well as institutions and organizations) between
Scotland and the rUK, reducing activity-dependency over time. With
more control over tax and spend, and a Scottish government predisposi-
tion towards high tax and spend, a shrinking tax base in Scotland quickly
leads to pressure on public-spending, and choices over tax and spend that
lead to further economic decline. And while Scotland is able to begin tai-
loring economic and social policy for Scottish needs, it loses the 10% extra
funding it receives as an anomaly in the UK's funding formula for its de-
volved regions. The Scottish government ﬁnds it increasingly difﬁcult to
maintain their extensive social programs, but blames London for cut-
backs. An unintended consequence of declining ﬁnancial capital inScotland, is that the symbolic capital of the nationalists begins to decline,
and with the Scottish electorate growing sceptical of the ‘blame-London’
strategy of the Scottish government as the transition costs to devolution
increase, the nationalists lose theirmajority in the 2016 Scottish elections.
In 2017, Scotland's pro-European vote give the ‘remain’ campaign a nar-
row victory in a UK in-out referendum on continuing EU membership,
creating resentment in amore Euro-sceptical England. Another unintend-
ed consequence is that increasing joblessness rates in Scotland begin
catalysing entrepreneurial activity and the green shoots of economic re-
covery. In this scenario, agency changes structure, but then structure con-
strains agency as event time lengthens and ﬁeld-level structures go
through signiﬁcant adjustment.
4.5. Epilogue: What happened: Brexit and the specter of ‘neverendums’
The Scottish referendum on September 18th, 2014, resulted in a 45%
to 55% win for the ‘no’ side. At 7:00 AM the following morning, with an
impending general election, the Conservative PrimeMinister, David Cam-
eron, announced that there would be a refocusing of politics on England.
This created a backlash in Scotland,with the ScottishNational Party (SNP)
winning all but a handful of parliamentary seats in Scotland, and the Con-
servatives winning a majority government nationally, confounding poll-
sters who had not predicted it, in a May 7, 2015 general election. The
UK government, however, had pledged devolved powers to Scotland,
and within 15 months of the referendum, the UK government and the
Scottish government had negotiated, in effect, somewhere between
devo major and minor (with the Scottish parliament now responsible
for raising over half of their ﬁscal spending). Within one month of the
Scottish referendum, however, the price of oil dropped to less than half
the Scottish government projections. The Government Expenditure and
Revenue Scotland (GERS) bulletin for 2014–2015 showed that Scotland's
deﬁcit, including a geographic share of oil, was about 9.7% of Gross Do-
mestic Product (GDP) (compared to the UK average of 4.9%). Plans
drawn up by the Bank of England (BoE) in the run-up to the Scottish ref-
erendum imply that there would not have been a currency union with
Scotland. Moreover, some Scottish companies, such as insurer Scottish
Widows, have been quietly consolidating their holdings in London. How-
ever, the Conservative government held an ‘in-out’ referendum on its
continuing membership in the EU on 23rd of June 2016, with the ‘leave’
side garnering 51.89% of the vote for a ‘Brexit’. Scotland voted in favor of
staying in the EU by 62% to 38%, leading its First Minister, Nicola Sturgeon
to state that a second Scottish referendum on independence from the UK
was “highly likely”. This puts Scotland squarely in ‘neverendum’ (repeat-
ed referendums) territory. Initial attempts by the Scottish government to
broker a dealwith the EU for Scotland's continuingmembership in the EU
were robustly rejected by, in particular, interventions by the Spanish,
which gives an indication of the position some EU countries would have
assumed in political negotiations with Scotland.
4.6. Section summary
The four scenarios that we developed are an illustration of the per-
spicacity of incorporating concepts from social theory into the intuitive
logics method. Notions of ‘objective’ structure interacting with the pre-
dispositions of ‘subjective actors/agents, we suggest, naturally accom-
modate different forms of causality, thereby giving a more realistic
understanding of the socio-political complexity involved in widespread
economical and societal change. Events since the referendum have un-
folded largely within the parameters set-out by the scenarios, providing
some anecdotal support for the augmentation of the IL method.
5. Analysis and discussion
The article began by asking how can a social theory-informed under-
standing augment notions of causality in the IL approach to scenario
planning? The article also sought to elaborate on how notions of agency
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this, how different notions of temporality could be incorporated into
the IL approach to scenario development? To address these questions,
we draw on Wright et al.'s (2013) three primary purposes of scenario
planning to elaborate on our key contributions.
First, we enhance challenging conventional thinking by incorporating
notions of efﬁcient, ﬁnal, formal and material causality in a social theory
derived framework, and re-orient scenario planning towards the socio-
political foundations underpinning the economic dynamics of emerging
futures (e.g. Derbyshire and Wright, in press). As numerous social theo-
rists have argued (e.g. Bourdieu, 2005; MacKanzie, 2006), markets are
largely socially constructed concepts. They are not something that exists
independent of social interactions, but are indeed both the medium and
product of them. O'Brien andMeadows (2013) point out that participants
in scenario planning interventions frequently focus on economic activity,
be they growth rates, exchange rates, interest rates, productivity changes
etc., giving these causally efﬁcient factors primacy over other types of dy-
namics, which leads to “future myopia”. This is because, as Wright et al.
(2013) argue, there is nothing inherent in scenario processes that lead
to a broader, or indeed more in-depth look at the causally ﬁnal, formal
or material causes inherent in the subjective predispositions of agents
interacting with “objective structures” that both constrain and enable
emerging futures.Wherewe contribute to this line of thinking is by build-
ing on a framework informed by social theory that, by incorporating no-
tions of agent–structure interactions, naturally accommodates all four
types of causality. Moreover, by incorporating the temporalizing nature
of ‘event’ time,which speaks to an ‘internal’ logic underpinning the emer-
gence of scenarios, with ‘clock-time’, which is an external, often imposed
logic, a more plausible indication and fuller causal accounting of what is
possible as causes and events interact and unfold over time.
In the scenarios for the Future of Scotland and the UK, in the short-to-
medium term, there was little evidence that suggested that the cultural,
social and economic change that would have had to occur for the inde-
pendence ‘lite’ scenario to occur. For there to have been signiﬁcant insti-
tutional continuity between an iScotland and rUK, as with a common
currency, the rUK government would have had to have risen above the
real-politick of national interests. International ﬁnancial institutions, who
werewriting increasingly skeptical reports on the prospects of, for exam-
ple, an iScotland and rUK monetary union without a ﬁscal or political
union,would have had to have suddenly reversed their direction of travel.
This assumes that a supra-political will would come to the fore, and agen-
cy would overcome structure. Here, efﬁcient and ﬁnal cause are, there-
fore, constrained by formal and material cause. Even had they done so,
the rUK would have been predisposed to insist on restrictions on an
iScotland's ability to borrow and spend. Large businesseswho are respon-
sible a signiﬁcant proportion of both private sector employment and in-
come, and whose UK trade is, on average, 80–90% focused on the rUK
(with 60 million people), and 10–20% with Scotland (with 5.5 million
people), would have also had to have been willing to accept the risk of
being located in a separate jurisdiction from the majority of their cus-
tomers. In addition, survey evidence suggests that Scottish social attitudes
and English social attitudes don't differ markedly onmajor issues like the
EU and immigration. The Scots care a little more about the EU, and a little
less about immigration. Such predispositions would constrain a Scottish
government's ability to, as one example, throw the doors open to immi-
gration to combat an aging population even if it were in their gift to do so.
An iScottish government whose spend is, on average, 10% higher
than the rUK, which is subsidized through a block grant from the rUK,
after having spent the referendum campaign guaranteeing free health-
care, free prescriptions, free education (including early child-hood and
post-secondary education), and a more generous range of social bene-
ﬁts, plus keeping taxes consistentwith the rUK,would have been reliant
on the price of oil (which is a major industry in Scotland) hitting, if not
exceeding the optimistic $USD 113/barrel that they were forecasting (it
dropped to half that within onemonth of the September 18th, 2014 ref-
erendum). Or there would have had to have been substantial gains inentrepreneurial activity and productivity to maintain growth and the
accompanying tax receipts. Yet, while Scotland spends about four
times the rUK average on economic development, and has some vibrant
pockets of entrepreneurial activity as well as enviable support for start-
ups, it still lags behind the rUK on new venture creation. Again, the ﬁnal
cause of agency is constrained by the formal andmaterial cause of struc-
ture.Whilst none of this is, of course, impossible, it would require a sub-
stantial shift in the “inner conversation” that is a mediatingmechanism
between actors and structures, and many of the actors to act in ways
that were counter to prevailing predispositions (even though predispo-
sitions can change over time) and would result in a reconﬁguration of
objective structures, and also the predispositions of actors. The activi-
ties, practices and different modes of interacting that would have to
evolve are, however, closely boundupwith event time (what is possible
within the internal logic of unfolding causal interactions) rather than
clock time (the imposition of deadlines and schedules).
Second, the framework we have developed here helps to extend the
enhancement of understanding by developing a set of social theory ax-
ioms that can be used for a more robust analysis of the underlying cau-
sality, connections and logical sequences of unfolding events. By
coupling a more nuanced understanding of causal explanation with an
internal logic, rather than an over-reliance on the external logic of
cause-effect drivers that predominates in IL approaches to scenario
planning theory and practice, we show how different forms of causality
interact to both constrain and enable possible futures (cf. Burt, 2007;
Derbyshire and Wright, in press). This diverges somewhat from
Derbyshire and Wright (2014) who argue for weakening dependence
on causation. We take the opposite view, arguing that an emphasis on
causality should be strengthened, albeit with a greater focus on efﬁcient,
ﬁnal, formal andmaterial causal explanations inherent in interactions be-
tween the predispositions of actors and social structures (cf Derbyshire
and Wright, in press), whose outcomes ultimately determine the evolu-
tion of alternative futures. It is also important to note that efﬁcient
cause can change; at times it is agency, and at other times it is structure.
Final cause, by contrast, aligns more closely to agency, whereas material
cause, and often formal cause are frequently reﬂected in structure.
Third, the success of the scenario interventions in Royal Dutch/Shell
in the 1970s and 1980s, we propose, was also down to the sophisticated
understanding that the planners of the day had of such social structures,
and the logics guiding the actions of different actors. Our framework,
therefore, aids decision-making by incorporating and extending the
work of Hughes (2013), who calls for greater attention to the interests
and power between actors to be given in shaping futures in scenario
analysis. This is particularly the case in public-policy scenarios, as was
the context for our study. It also resonates closely with Wright and
Goodwin's (2009) suggestion that there be a more signiﬁcant incorpo-
ration of stakeholder interests, as an indicator of agency, with the
unfolding of PESTEL (political, economic, social/demographic, techno-
logical, environmental, legal) forces in scenario analysis. In a similar
vein, it also extends the work of MacKay and Tambeau (2013) who
were more narrowly focused on the ‘duality of structure’ in their analy-
sis. We do this by delvingmore deeply into the nature of actors and ob-
jective structures and emphasizing the important of temporalization in
causal explanations of what is possible, or indeed even plausible in
unfolding futures. This implicit understanding of what actions would
have to be taken (efﬁcient and ﬁnal cause) in the face of activity depen-
dence, and how wider structures would respond to them over time
(material and formal cause) is arguably what makes the logics of the
scenarios intuitively appealing (cf. Wack, 1985a,b; Jefferson, 2012).
Causality is important, but as Burt (2007) and Derbyshire and Wright
(in press) rightly point out, the type of causality matters also.
6. Conclusions
This paper has sought to augment notions of causality in the IL ap-
proach to scenario planning. To do so, we drew on a social theory-
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illustrate how notions of agent–structure interactions can enhance the
intuitive logics (IL) process. By incorporating such concepts as the ‘sub-
jective’ predispositions of agency, ‘objective’ structures of social sys-
tems, activity dependence, unintended consequences of action and
event-time temporality in the IL method, we have developed a frame-
work to systematically analyze causation in the scenario process. We
have also sought to illustrate the constraining and enabling role that
agent–structure interactions play in the unfolding of futures in social
systems by applying the social theory-informed IL framework to a sce-
nario exercise undertaken in the lead-up to the Scottish referendum
on independence from the United Kingdom on September 18th, 2014.
Our contributions to both theory and practice are, therefore, the exten-
sion of the conceptual and methodological axioms underpinning IL ap-
proaches to scenario planning.
6.1. Research limitations
There are several limitations of ourwork thatwewish to drawatten-
tion to. We are conscious that our analysis, which has stemmed from
‘action-research’, is also a product of our own predispositions. We
have attempted to compensate for this by ensuring that the work car-
ried out here is both empirically rooted and theoretically informed.
We also acknowledge that this work was carried out in a highly politi-
cally charged environment, and as such, will have certainly moderated
some of the more extreme future possibilities. A desire to maintain ‘po-
litical neutrality’ will have also certainly played a part in how the sce-
nario exercise, and its theorization, unfolded. It is also worth noting
that the particular framework we present here may or may not be ap-
propriate for every context. Indeed, the scenario ﬁeld itself is a vibrant
area of theoretical and practical development, and by its very nature it
more craft than science. This is something, in our view, that is its core
strength and should be celebrated, if critically.
6.2. Future research directions
In this article we have built on previous work that incorporates so-
ciological thinking into the IL approach to scenario planning. We see,
however, tremendous potential to continue to develop this line of inqui-
ry. Drawing on ideas around strategic interactions, for example, or even
the bourgeoning ﬁeld of institutional logics will help to further develop
concepts of causality in IL methods.
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